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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Desiree Eliasen appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding her guilty of stalking. Eliassen claims there was insufficient evidence to 
support her conviction. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Eliasen with, and a jury found her guilty of, second-
degree stalking. (R., pp.96, 160-161, 270.) On April 28, 2009, the magistrate 
imposed 180 days in jail with 140 days suspended and placed Eliasen on 
probation for two years. (R., p.278.) Eliasen filed a timely notice of appeal from 
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.312-316.) 
For reasons which are unclear from the record, Eliasen's intermediate 
appeal to the district court languished until August 1, 2012, at which time Eliasen 
filed an amended notice of appeal after the magistrate court denied her request 
for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. (R., pp.11-13.) In fact, in her amended 
notice of appeal, which was actually captioned "Amended Notice of Appeal 
Denying Motion to Dismiss; Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea; and the Motion to 
Reconsider," Eliasen stated the issue on appeal as whether the court erred in 
denying her motion to dismiss and set aside her guilty plea, which the court 
originally denied on June 1, 2012, and again on June 20, 2012, in response to 
Eliasen's motion to reconsider. (R., pp.11-12, 377-380, 381-386.) Six months 
later, however, Eliasen filed a "Second Amended Notice of Appeal" indicating 
she was appealing from the "1) Judgment of Conviction entered on April 28, 
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2008; 2) Decision and Order entered on June 1, 2012; 3) Decision and Order 
entered on June 20, 2012." (R., pp.22-24.) 
On appeal to the district court, Eliasen only challenged the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support her conviction. (R., pp.26-42.) The district court 
affirmed. (R., pp.69-88.) Eliasen filed a timely notice of appeal from the district 
court's Memorandum Decision on appeal. (R., pp.90-92.) 
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ISSUE 
Eliasen states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the state present sufficient evidence to prove that Ms. Eliasen 
engaged in a "course of conduct" that seriously alarmed, annoyed 
or harassed the victim? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court correctly conclude that the state presented sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Eliasen was guilty of second-degree stalking? 
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ARGUMENT 
Eliasen Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Concluding The 
Evidence Was Sufficient To Support Her Conviction For Second-Degree Stalking 
A. Introduction 
Eliasen challenges the district court's intermediate appellate decision 
rejecting her claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for 
second-degree stalking. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-11.) Specifically, she contends 
the court erred in concluding her behavior constituted a "course of conduct as 
required by statute." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Eliasen's argument fails. A review 
of the plain language of the second-degree stalking statute, I.C. § 18-7906, and 
the evidence presented shows the district court correctly concluded there was 
sufficient evidence to support Eliasen's conviction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kl (citing Losser, 145 
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Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 
P.2d at 1072. 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded There Was Sufficient Evidence To 
Prove The Essential Elements Of Second-Degree Stalking 
The magistrate instructed the jury that in order to find Eliasen guilty of 
second-degree stalking, the state was required to prove the following elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about the 26th day of September, 2008, 
2. in the City of Pocatello, County of Bannock, State of Idaho 
3. the defendant Desiree Eliasen, 
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4. knowingly and maliciously 
5. engaged in a course of conduct 
6. that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed Lynette 
Sampson 
7. in a manner that would cause a reasonable person 
substantial emotional distress. 
(R., p.300; see also I.C. § 18-7906.) 
Eliasen claims, as she did below, that the state failed to meet its burden of 
proof with regard to the fifth element - that her actions constituted a course of 
cond purposes of the second-degree stalking statute. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.7-11.) The district court disagreed. 
Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(a) defines "course of conduct" as "repeated acts 
of nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family or household member 
of the victim" unless the conduct is "constitutionally protected activity." With 
respect to Eliasen's "course of conduct," the district court found the "record 
establishes the following facts": 
The victim is married to Officer Richard Sampson, a Pocatello 
Police officer. They have two young children. On Friday, 
September 26, 2008, the victim took her three-year-old daughter 
with her to make a donation at the local Goodwill store and to shop 
at Fred Meyer. As the victim backed out of her driveway she 
noticed a brown Chevy Blazer stopped in the road facing east. The 
victim waited for the vehicle to proceed down the street, but when 
the Blazer did not move, the victim proceeded to back out and 
head west down Wyldwood Lane. The Blazer made a U-turn and 
followed the victim down Wyldwood. Ms. Sampson traveled 
several blocks making four turns and eventually stopping at the 
Goodwill store on Yellowstone Ave. The Blazer followed the victim 
the entire way. At Goodwill, the victim exited her vehicle and 
carried her donations to the door where a Goodwill employee took 
the donations from her. 
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The victim then got back in her vehicle, proceeded to exit the 
Goodwill parking lot onto Pine Street, and then stopped at the 
traffic light on Yellowstone. At this point, the victim became 
concerned about the Blazer following her. When the light changed, 
the victim turned on to Yellowstone heading north towards Fred 
Meyer. The Blazer followed. Instead of proceeding to Fred Meyer, 
the victim made a right turn onto Cedar Street and the Blazer 
followed. Upon realizing that she was being followed, the victim 
became "really frightened" and attempted to call her husband, 
Officer Sampson. The first call was unsuccessful, but the victim 
successfully contacted her husband via a second phone call. The 
victim and her husband then decided the [sic] she should proceed 
to the police station to meet her husband there. The victim made a 
right turn onto Jefferson Ave, a subsequent right onto Oak St. and 
finally a left on to Sherman, where the police station is located. It 
was not until the victim turned on to Sherman, right in front of the 
police station, that the Blazer ceased following. Instead, the Blazer 
continued down Oak Street. The victim remained concerned about 
being followed all the way to the police station. The victim later 
identified Ms. Eliasen as the driver of the Blazer. 
(R., pp.70-71.) 1 
Eliasen asserts "the evidence was insufficient" because, she contends, 
"there was only a single occurrence of non-consensual contact between [herself] 
and Ms. Sampson." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) According to Eliasen, "the principles 
of statutory interpretation require that conclusion." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) The 
district court correctly rejected this argument. 
1 By way of background, the state also presented evidence that, approximately 
six weeks prior, Eliasen was involved in an incident where Officer Sampson was 
one of the responding officers. (Trial Tr., p.36, Ls.1-14.) During that incident, 
Eliasen, while looking toward the parking lot where Officer Sampson and other 
were standing, told another individual, that she "hoped those guys don't have 
wives or kids at home because we know what's going to happen when ... I 
make a phone call or like the phone call I made last time and someone took care 
of it." (Trial Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.42, L.19.) Eliasen was "mad and angry and sharp 
tongued" when she made the statement. (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.11-12.) 
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"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the 
statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
the statute must be construed as a whole."' Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. 
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). "'If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written."' ~ 
As noted, I.C. §18-7906(2)(a) defines course of conduct for purposes of 
second-degree stalking as requiring "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact." 
Section 18-7906(2)(c) in turn defines the term "nonconsensual contact." It 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(i) Following the victim or maintain surveillance, including by 
electronic means, on the victim; 
(ii) Contacting the victim in a public place or on private property; 
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; 
1.C. § 18-7906(2)(c).2 
The district court found the evidence presented satisfied the repeated acts 
of nonconsensual contact element because Eliasen engaged in more than one 
type of prohibited contact - conducting surveillance, following Sampson, and 
appearing at Sampson's residence. (R., pp.83-84.) The district court reasoned: 
In the facts before the Court today, the victim intended to 
conduct charitable business at Goodwill. The stop at Goodwill was 
2 The statute includes other types of nonconsensual contact that are not 
pertinent here. I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(iv)-(vii). 
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not merely a brief pause in the victim's movements during the travel 
to a destination. Instead, the stop at Goodwill was the reaching of 
a destination. When the victim stopped at Goodwill and began 
conducting her business there, [Eliasen] was no longer following 
the victim. Instead [Eliasen] was maintaining surveillance, a 
separate form of prohibited conduct explicitly mentioned in the 
stalking statute. When the victim left the Goodwill, the surveillance 
ended and a new instance of following began and continued until 
[Eliasen] broke off her pursuit of the victim. 
Additionally, the issue before this court is not limited to 
whether the stop at Goodwill created a break in the following 
sufficient to create two instances of following. . . . In addition to 
the Court finding that the stop at Goodwill was sufficient to create a 
break in the following, it is also true that prior to ever following the 
victim, [Eliasen] was waiting outside the victim's house. Appearing 
at a victim's residence is explicitly recognized as prohibited under 
the statute and separate from following. That means that before 
ever following the victim, [Eliasen] had already committed one 
instance of conduct. Even if the episode of following were not 
broken up by the stop at Goodwill, the following itself could 
reasonably have been seen by the trier of fact as the second 
instance of prohibited conduct. 
The facts of this case amount to not only two instances of 
prohibited conduct, but instead four instances of prohibited 
conduct. First, [Eliasen] appeared at the victim's residence before 
ever following the victim. Second, [Eliasen] followed the victim to 
Goodwill. Third, [Eliasen] conducted surveillance on the victim 
while the victim conducted her business at Goodwill. And fourth, 
[Eliasen] followed the victim from the Goodwill store nearly the 
entire way to the police station. 
(R., pp.83-85 (footnotes omitted).) 
Eliasen claims the district court's rationale was erroneous, contending that 
"[w]hile the type of prohibited contact changed during the course of the 
nonconsensual contact, there was still only one contact." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10.) In other words, Eliasen contends, there was "no break in the contact." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) However, the plain language of the statute does not 
require a "break in the contact." Rather, it only requires "repeated acts of 
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nonconsensual contact," with "nonconsensual contact" being further defined as 
including certain types of actions. Repeated, when read in context, means more 
than one nonconsensual contact, which the district court found existed in this 
case. Nonetheless, even if a break was required, one occurred at Goodwill. 
The district court correctly concluded that the state presented sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find the state met its burden with respect to 
this element. Eliasen has failed to show otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Eliasen guilty of second-degree stalking. 
DATED this 15th day of April 2014. 
{\ 
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